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Abstract 
 
This paper is a deductive theoretical enquiry into the flow of effects from the geometry of price 
bubbles/busts, to price indices, to pricing behaviours of sellers and buyers, and back to price 
bubbles/busts.  The intent of the analysis is to suggest analytical approaches to identify the presence, 
maturity, and/or sustainability of a price bubble.  We present a pricing model to emulate market 
behaviour, including numeric examples and charts of the interaction of supply and demand.  The 
model extends into dynamic market solutions myopic (single- and multi-period) backward looking 
rational expectations to demonstrate how buyers and sellers interact to affect supply and demand and 
to show how capital gain expectations can be a destabilising influence – i.e. the lagged effects of past 
price gains can drive the market price away from long-run market-worth.  Investing based on the 
outputs of past price-based valuation models appear to be more of a game-of-chance than a sound 
investment strategy. 
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Introduction 
Buy cheap and sell dear is sound, ubiquitous trading advice that traces from Warren Buffet's (2000) 
strategy on technical analysis, back through Hetty Green (1834-1916) as The Witch of Wall Street 
(Garrison, 1982), to A New View of Society by Robert Owen (1816), to Adam Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations (Bk 4, Ch 2, 1776), to St. Augustine (On the Holy Trinity, Bk XIII, Ch 4, 400) – who attributed it 
even further back – to the Poet Ennius (239-169 BCE) of the early Roman Republic.1  An earlier 
writing by Aristotle (350 BCE) attributes the concept of buy low and sell high to the philosopher Thales 
the Milesian (6th Century BCE).  This ancient, time-tested maxim epitomises this paper’s first three 
theorems:  
1) Price differs from value—even if drawn from a free-market, arms-length sale, price may 
be: Greater than, Equal to, or Less than Value. 
A Price-Value axiom and corollary supports the first theorem by drawing from rational economic 
behaviour to show that a seller/(buyer) will only freely sell/(buy) if the:  
1a) Sales price (Ps) is above the value a seller places on what s/he is selling, and 
1b) Sales price (Ps) is below the value a buyer places on what s/he is buying. 
                                                          
 1  St. Augustine told the story of an actor, who in a witty joke said “...that he would say in the theatre ...what all 
had in their minds, and what all willed ... [and then] with great expectation, all being in suspense and silent, is 
affirmed to have said: Your will to buy cheap, and sell dear...”   
 2
A second Price-Value corollary, derived from the above assertions, contends that: 
1c) A sale requires that the buyer’s value-estimate (Vb) exceeds that of the seller (Vs) – even 
though the buyer’s initial offer price is below the seller’s initial asking price, and the corollary 
is that the seller' value-estimate (Vs) is less than that of buyer’s value-estimate (Vb).  
Logically: if, per axiom (1a) and corollary (1b), Vs < Ps < Vb, then: Vs < Vb.2.  Then, in the 
marketing process, the equilibrium will be met and the price agreed at the Marshallian 
scissor's intersection3 where Vs  Vb = Ps, i.e. where the competing offers in response to the 
adjusting seller's and buyer's values just meet establishing the market price Ps. 
A third Price-Value corollary, derived from the logic in corollary (1c), asserts that: 
1d) Value-estimates not only differ from price but, also, differ between buyer and seller.  
The above assertions demonstrate that price and value are insufficient to explain a market – an ideal 
or archetypical value (market-worth) is needed to explain market behaviour – this leads to the second 
and third theorem in this paper: 
2) Market-worth is what sellers and buyers are guesstimating when each sets a value 
– value-estimates are probability densities with the market nature subsumed in the 
functional form (normal, log-normal, normal approximation to the binomial, etc.) and the 
expected risk represented by the standard deviation. 
3) Price differs from market-worth – even if drawn from a free-market, arms-length sale, 
price may be: Greater than, Equal to, or Less than market-worth. 
Supporting the third theorem is an axiom drawn from the Price-Value corollary (1c): 
3a) The sales price is derived from within the overlap of a seller’s and a buyer’s 
imperfect value-estimates of market worth (respectively, Vs and Vb) and a transaction is 
concluded as Vs  Vb. (see Figure 1 – the negotiating market behaviour occurs in the 
area to the left of the equilibrium point where Vs < Vb.) 
This paper is a deductive theoretical enquiry into how and why market price rises above market-worth 
(i.e. a price bubble) and the means by which a market eventually corrects from a bubble back to the 
fundamental of market-worth. 
THE WORTHY NOTION OF WORTH 
The analysis in this paper uses the concepts of Price and Value and Market-worth (the market-worth 
is the archetypical value of what is being bought/sold).  While the market-worth is usually imperfectly 
known, rational buyers and sellers seek to estimate market-worth in their Value-estimates.  The 
importance of worth can be taken in the observation that St. Augustine neither extolled Buy cheap and 
sell dear as an aphorism of thrift nor saw it as a valid way-of-life but asserted “...such a will is in truth a 
fault...”.  If that maxim is expanded to: buy cheaper than what it is worth and sell dearer than what it is 
worth, it clearly celebrates the base, mean traits of sharp-trading, deceit, cupidity, and even fraud. 
While a variety of owner-specific circumstances/attributes can alter the fundamentals of worth after an 
ownership change (scale effect, externalities, aesthetics, opportunity, sub-division, development, etc.), 
worth tends to be relatively stable, in either absolute or dynamic terms.  While, The Greater Fool 
Theory is a non-worth-based-investing logic, it provides scant comfort if there are no fools greater than 
oneself.4  Given the assumption of rational-risk-averse investors, worth is a basic fundamental of 
value estimation. 
It is important to note this paper makes the simplifying assumption that the core-worth functions of the 
buyer and seller are identical—the differences in the buyer and seller Value-estimates are due to risk-
induced discount differences arising from information asymmetries – i.e. the seller’s knowledge and 
understanding of the properties attributes are more complete than those of the buyer.  Value-estimate 
differences between buyers are due to differences in perceptions, risk preferences, and other 
                                                          
 2  This contention appears to contradict conventional property valuation theory (Ratcliff, 1949, 1965, and 1979; 
AIREA .1984; Baum, et. al, 1996) but is, in fact, consistent with it when represented as the seller moving a left-
wise in a down-ward direction along the supply curve and a buyer moving left-wise in an up-wards direction 
along the demand curve, in response to offers and counter-offers towards an equilibrium point at the meeting of 
the "Marshallian" scissors.3 
 3  Attributed to economist Marshall, Alfred (1842-1924).  
 4  The belief held by one who makes a questionable investment, with the assumption that s/he will be able to sell 
it later to a bigger fool. 
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attributes—a similar argument can be made for Value-estimate differences between sellers. 
THE MODEL 
This paper, being theoretical in nature, affords the comfort of simplifying assumptions and certainty of 
outcome in its definitions. While price, value, and worth are often seen as synonyms, in this paper, 
each has a very specific and different meaning: 
 P = Price = what is paid for an asset (property, precious metal/gem, fine art, etc.), 
 V = Value = an estimate of worth – the price that should be paid for an asset, 
 Vs, Vb = the estimates of worth made by, respectively, the seller and the buyer, and 
 W = Worth = the Fisherian value of an item, as defined by the present value (PV) of all of its net 
cash flows.5 While the market participants are assumed to have indefinite 
estimates of worth, the analysis will, in this theory paper, contrast the price and 
value-estimates with the definitive worth – e.g. all the cash flows and the discount 
rates are given. 
Modelling Worth 
In real estate, a property’s future value flows (i.e. cash or equivalent) consist of real or imputed net 
rents from improvements (gross rent less any operating and/or maintenance expenses), net earnings 
from rural land (gross farm income less any associated costs of production, harvest, other on-farm 
items, and transportation out), lifestyle benefits, other psychic-gains, and any capital gain at the time 
of future sale. 
WΏ = ƒ(Y, g, n, d) (1) 
W = market-worth  
Ω = end of period Ω 
N = year from start at 0 
Y = annual net return at series start 
G = real rate of growth in Y 
 ir = risk-free discount rate6 
The functional form of eqn (1) is assumed to be: 
 t = ∞  
WΩ = Σ  Y(1+g)Ω[(1+g)/(1+ ir)](t-Ω) (1b) 
 t = Ω 
If all expectations of capital gain are solely linked to constant growth in income, the simplifying 
assumptions in the Gordon Growth Model (Gordon, 1962) are appropriate and it can be used to 
contract eqn (1b) to: 
WΩ = Y(1+g)(Ω+1)/( ir -g) (2) 
Equation (2) describes how market-worth rises over time to reflect the rising net inflows of value to the 
asset – NB: these rises in market-worth are due to time-value-of-money effects and (similar to the 
price rise of a zero-coupon bond) should be seen as income, rather than interpreted as a capital gain.7 
Modelling Value-estimates 
If the seller/buyer had perfect information s/he would know the market-worth of what was being 
sold/bought and both would have the same point Value-estimate – thus, under perfect information: 
Vs = Vb = WΩ  (3) 
However, as noted previously, the value-estimates of the seller (Vs) and buyer (Vb) are attempts to 
estimate market-worth from imperfect information—these imperfections are represented in the model 
via normally distributed error terms of, respectively, Єs and Єb with nil means and standard deviations 
                                                          
 5  Fisher (1906). 
 6  Due to the assumption above that "all the cash flows and the discount rates are given", in estimating definitive 
worth WΩ. 
 7  Many types of assets, including zero-coupon bonds, go through this similar process: Market-values reflect the 
discounted expected yield-to-maturity; Subsequent market-values are higher because, with the passage of 
time, a portion of the previously recognized expected value flow is realized; The realization of an expected 
value flow (e.g. as a periodic payment, lump sum, or price rise) should always be treated as a regular 
income/(loss). Only an unexpected value flow (from unexpected shifts in: interest rates, investor confidence, 
asset risk, etc.) should be treated as a capital gain/(loss). 
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of, respectively, σs and σb. In recognition of their imperfect knowledge, the seller and buyer, adjust for 
the associated risk by increasing their respective discount rates to, respectively, is and ib. 
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Given that a seller tends to have more experience with the asset being sold/bought than a buyer, 
logically: 
 σs < σb (4) 
 is  <  ib (5) 
Sellers and buyers are limited in the information that they can access when they seek to 
operationalize their value-estimates of worth: 
 VsΩ = ƒ(Y, is, PΩ, PΩ-1, PΩ-2, PΩ-3, … PΩ-n, WΩ, PΩ, Q, Ks)  (6) 
 VbΩ = ƒ(Y, ib, PΩ, PΩ-1, PΩ-2, PΩ-3, … PΩ-n, WΩ, PΩ, Q, Ks) (7) 
PΩ = price at the end of period Ω; 
NB: in equilibrium: PΩ - PΩ-1 = 0 
Q = Quantity 
Ks = stock of what is being sold 
Sellers and buyers are assumed to include in their valuation the annual earnings (or the equivalent) 
and any expected future capital gains—as the later are difficult to estimate, a backward-looking 
rational expectations approach was assumed (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1993) using a one year myopic 
estimate and a rolling three-year average (with declining weightings over the three years). Unlike 
annual earnings, capital gains cannot rationally be expected to continue forever—thus, the model 
uses a multiplier to capture expected duration (e.g. three to 20 years) and uses sales quantity divided 
by total available stock to adjust for perceived risk (e.g. risk is higher when sales are lower). Differing 
perceptions and personal attributes among the sellers and the buyers are recognized by having the 
value-estimates centred on a mean value with a normally distributed error term:  
 VsΩ = Y(1+g)(Ω+1)/( is - g) + π  ± Єs  (6a)  
π = capital gain expectations 
 VbΩ = Y(1+g)(Ω+1)/( ib - g) + π  ± Єb   (7a) 
In equilibrium, the capital gain expectations are, by definition, nil (i.e. PΩ = PΩ-1 = PΩ-2 = PΩ-3 = … = PΩ-
n) and eqns (6a) and (7a) reduce to:8 
 VsΩ = Y(1+g)(Ω+1)/( is - g) ± Єs  (6b) 
 VbΩ = Y(1+g)(Ω+1)/( ib - g) ± Єb  (7b) 
In a dynamic adjustment situation, with myopic (one-year) backward-looking rational expectations, the 
capital gains expectations are defined by:  
 π = γPΩ(1– PΩ-1/PΩ)(αWΩ/PΩ)φ(1+ ir)(1/ψ) (8) 
α = scaling parameter 
γ = duration parameter (3.00  ≤  γ  ≤ 20.00) 
φ = slope parameter 
ψ = discount period 
The term WΩ/PΩ, in eqn (8) exponentially damps capital-gains expectations, as the fraction of the 
stock being sold falls—it is irrelevant in equilibrium, because (by definition) the capital-gains 
expectations are nil in equilibrium. 
In a dynamic adjustment situation with backward-looking rational expectations based on three years, 
eqns (8) becomes:  
 π = γPΩ(1 – .5PΩ-1/PΩ – .3PΩ-2/PΩ-1 – .2PΩ-3/PΩ-2)(αWΩ/PΩ)φ(1+ ir)(1/ψ) (8a) 
The sum of the weightings in eqn (8a) equal one—the weightings9 reflect the idea that recent years 
have a greater effect on capital gains expectations than earlier years. 
Modelling Market Behaviour 
The value-estimate variability represented in the error terms in eqns (6a) and (7a) drives the market. 
Specifically, sales require an overlap in the above distributions and the market-clearing price occurs at 
the price that sets eqn (6a) equal to eqn (7a). 
In eqn (6a), as Єs approaches negative infinity, the fraction of sellers active in the market (Qs/Ks) 
                                                          
8  This part of the model is consistent with property valuation practises, but is flawed—it double counts the returns 
from rises in annual income (i.e. once in the Gordon growth part of the equation and again as a price rise that 
increases expectations of future capital gains). As long as π is nil, double counting is theoretical rather than a 
real issue. 
 9  These need to be established by empirical analysis but are logically in descending order with greatest weight 
on the most recent period and declining over the number of backwards looking periods. 
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approaches nil; when Єs equals nil, half the potential sellers are active in the market; as Єs 
approaches infinity, all sellers are active in the market.  A similar but opposite effect occurs in eqn (7a) 
for buyers as Єb rises from negative infinity to nil to infinity (see Figure 1). 
The Cumulative-Normal-Density functions for Єs and Єb are prohibitively complex, but approximated in 
shape and character by a variant of the Sigmoid form of the Logistic Curve (Wikipedia, 2007b). 
 Ms = 1/(1 + e-hkЄs) (9) 
 Єs = -ln(1/Ms – 1)/(hk) (9a) 
e = exponent 
ln  = natural log of (...) 
Ms = fraction of total sellers active 
h = a scaling parameter 
k = a slope parameter (related to σs) 
 Mb = 1/(1 + ehjMb) (10) 
 Єb = ln(1/Mb – 1)/(hj) (10a)  
Mb = fraction of total buyers active  
j = a slope parameter (related to σb) 
Once π (expectation of capital gain) is incorporated into the valuation equations, the Gordon growth 
effects should be removed to avoid double counting the income related capital gains.10 Thus, 
assuming sellers and buyers are aware of the double counting risk, removal of the Gordon growth 
effects from eqns (6a) and (7a) changes them to: 
 VsΩ = P = Y(1+g)Ω/is + π – ln(1/Ms – 1)/(hk) (11) 
 VbΩ = P = Y(1+g)Ω/ib + π + ln(1/Mb – 1)/(hj) (12) 
Equations (6a) and (7a) can be change and reorganized to: 
 Ms = 1/[1 + ehk([Y(1+g)
Ω]/is + π – P)] (13) 
 Mb = 1/[1 + ehj(P – π – [Y(1+g)
Ω]/is)] (14) 
Because there is no reason why the total potential supply of what is being sold has to, or should, 
equal the total potential demand for it, eqns (13) and (14) need to be modified before they can be 
used as, respectively, the supply curve and the demand curve: 
 Qs = KsMs  = Ks/[1 + ehk([Y(1+g)
Ω]/is + π – P)] (15) 
 Qd = DbMb = Db/[1 + ehj(P – π – [Y(1+g)
Ω]/ib)] (16) 
Q = Quantity 
Ks = capital stock of what is being sold 
Db = potential total demand 
 Qmkt = Qs = Qd (17) 
 Ks = ƒ(tax effects, (P-C), technology, ir, ω) (18) 
 Db = ƒ(Population, ib, ¥) (19) 
(P-C) = price less cost to build/construct, 
ir = risk-free discount rate 
ω = asset stock wasting or decay rate 
¥ = per capita income 
NUMERIC EXAMPLES 
Under Equilibrium 
In the real world, the forgoing flows and the appropriate discount rates are subject to massive 
uncertainty that is beyond the scope of this enquiry. This study simplifies the analysis by assuming 
that the: 
a) Inflation/deflation is nil, 
b) All sellers/(buyers) are identical, except for the differences subsumed in Єs/(Єb). 
c) All items being sold/(bought) are identical 
d) The parameters are: 
                                                          
10  The empirical issue of whether or not sellers, buyers, appraisers, and researchers are actually avoiding double 
counting income-related expectations of capital gain is an important issue that future research should seek to 
resolve—i.e. are eqns 10 and 11 more appropriate than eqns (6a) and (7a). 
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Figure1: Market supply and demand 
 
In Figure 1, the Equilibrium Price is between the Mean-Desired-Supply Price and the Mean-Desired-
Demand Price and the Equilibrium Quantity is to the left of the quantities associated with those points. 
This reflects three attributes found in most markets: 
1) Most sellers are reasonably “bearish” about the market, 
2) Most buyer are reasonably “bullish” about the market, and 
3) The total potential supply and demand are reasonably balanced. 
 
Table 1: Parameter description and assumed values, under equilibrium 
Description Symbol Value 
1) Real rate of growth in Y g 1.0 % 
2) Risk-Free Discount Rate ir 5.0 % 
3) Sellers’ Discount Rate is 6.0 % 
4) Buyers Discount Rate ib 7.0 % 
5) Scaling Parameter h .00001 
6) Scaling Parameter α 0.60 
6) Duration Parameter γ 10.0 
7) Slope Parameter (related to σs) k 3.0 
8) Slope Parameter (related to σb) j 4.0 
9) Slope Parameter φ 2.3 
10) Discount Period ψ 10 
11) Wasting or Decay Rate of the Asset Stock ω 3.0 % 
Assumed Starting Values for Key Variables Symbol Value 
a) Capital Gain Expectations π  0.0 
b) Annual Price Changes PΩ = PΩ-1 = PΩ-2 = PΩ-3 = ... = PΩ-n 
c) Annual Net Return at t = 0 Y $35,000 
d) Potential Total Sales  Ks 10,000,000 
e) Potential Total Purchases Db 11,000,000 
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Figure 2: market supply & demand, after a 20% increase in supply 
Increasing the total potential supply shifts the anchor point (quantity when P = $∞) in Figure 1 to the 
right which rotates the supply curve down around the origin and shifts the Equilibrium along the 
Demand Curve. Given the relatively elastic nature of demand over the vast majority of the feasible 
demand, large increases/(decreases) in total potential supply will, ceteris paribus, generate relatively 
small decreases/(increases) in Equilibrium Price. Similarly, large increases/(decreases) in total 
potential supply will, ceteris paribus, generate relatively small increases/(decreases) in Equilibrium 
Price. Given the assumptions in this model, if government policies are implemented that generate a 20 
percent increase in the housing stock, a long-run equilibrium will form at a price that is 0.70 percent 
below the earlier equilibrium price and at a quantity that is 11.0 percent above the earlier equilibrium 
quantity (Figure 2). 
If policies are implemented that generate a 20 percent decrease in the housing stock (e.g. mould 
causes a large number of houses to be abandoned as unfit for human habitation), a long-run 
equilibrium will form at a price .85 percent above the equilibrium price in Figure 1 and at a quantity 
that is 12.2 percent lower (Figure 3). 
Figures 2 and 3 indicate that government fiscal policy directed at affecting the total supply (Ks) has 
little effect on the long-run equilibrium housing price—fiscal policy rotates the supply curve up or down 
around the origin and, thus, has little effect on the Y-axis prices. Similarly, a large rise or fall in the 
total demand (Db) due to net immigration or migration will have little effect on the long-run equilibrium 
housing price — unless immigrants change the core-worth perspective in the buyer Value-estimate 
function (i.e. that would shift the demand curve, rather than rotate it around the Y-axis infinity point). 
Monetary policy effects are examined by shifting the discount rates (is and ib) up by 20 percent—
continuing with the assumption that buyers and sellers are identical except for the differences 
subsumed in is, ib, Єs, and Єb, it is assumed that a monetary policy shift in r affects is and ib by an 
equal percentage shift. Monetary policy is much blunter in its targeting than fiscal policy—it affects 
both supply and demand. 
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Figure 3: Market supply & demand after a 20% decrease in supply 
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Figure 4: Market supply & demand after a 20% rise in interest rates 
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Figure 4 shows that, given the model assumptions, a 20 percent rise in the seller and buyer discount 
rates will shift prices down by 19.0 percent (from $458,580 to $371,310) and will increase output by -
27.5 percent (2,013,300 units to 1,495,600 units).  
Figure 5 shows that, given the model assumptions, a 20 percent fall in the seller and buyer discount 
rates will shift prices up by 24.9 percent (from $458,400 to $599,990) and will decrease output by 37.3 
percent (2,013,300 units to 1,262,400 units).  
Based on Figures 4 and 5, monetary policy should be a powerful and effective means to manage the 
long-run-equilibrium housing price. 
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000
Quantity (,000)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
Pr
ic
e 
(in
 $
,0
00
s)
Supply
Demand
Shifted Supply
Shifted Demand
Mean Desired
Supply Price
Mean Desired
Demand Price
(1,262.4, $599.99)
 Equilibrium
 

 
Figure 5: Market supply & demand after a 20% fall in interest rates 
Dynamic Market Solution – Myopic Backward-looking Rational Expectations 
While long-run equilibrium outcomes in Figures 2 through 5 are interesting, as Keynes (1923, ch.3, 
p.65) observed “...in the long run we are all dead…” Thus, to be relevant to living voters, policy affects 
should also consider short- and intermediate-run dynamics. This model becomes dynamic if the 
equilibrium assumption of “π = nil” is relaxed. 
A dynamic view is approximated in this study by using eqns (15) and (16) to formulate partial market 
equilibriums monthly with the P of the current month becoming the PΩ of the next month and the PΩ-1 
of the 12th month following the next month—this gives a 12-month rolling average price rise. 
 Qs = KsMs  = Ks/[1 + ehk([Y(1+g)
Ω]/is + π – P)] (15) 
 Qd = DbMb = Db/[1 + ehj(P – π – [Y(1+g)
Ω]/ib)] (16) 
Under myopic (one year) backward-looking rational expectations, the expectations for future capital-
gains are defined by (see eqns (6c) and (7c), above): 
 π = γPΩ(1– PΩ-1/PΩ)(αWΩ/PΩ)φ(1+ ir)(1/ψ)  (8) 
The model is a cranky iterative process of searching for a market clearing price: 
 Qmkt = Qs = Qd (17) 
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Equation (8) embodies a simple but powerful actuarial/accounting/finance tenet that: In the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, the best predictor of the future is the past (Committee on International 
Accounting, 1975; Niehaus and Terry, 1993; AASB, 2004, pp. 13-18). The following turn-around 
equations were added to make the model implosive (i.e. by limiting the minimum and maximum 
prices): 
 @if(P <  0.40WΩ , π:=-0.10π) (20) 
 @if(P >  0.90WΩ , π:= 0.10π) (21) 
Equations (20) and (21) give the model prices a chaotic sine-curve shape (see Figure 6). In Figure 6, 
the lower risk-free discount rate causes the perfect-market-worth function to be well above the long-
run market-worth function.11 
The back-ward-looking model is transformed from a one-year to a three-year cycle by using eqn (8a) 
in place of (8): 
 π = γPΩ(1 – .5PΩ-1/PΩ – .3PΩ-2/PΩ-1 – .2PΩ-3/PΩ-2)(αWΩ/PΩ)φ(1+ ir)(1/ψ) (8a) 
It is clear in Figures 6 and 8 that the present value of the expected capital gains are a destabilising 
influence—i.e. drives the market-price cycle from the long-run market-worth trend. The lagged-effect 
of past price gains on current gains is apparent in Figures 7 and 9. 
In Figure 9, the price cycle appears to display a rapid large up-tick followed a series of echoes that 
diminished and eventually become negative until there is another rapid large up-tick in price, and so 
forth. 
In the controlled set of circumstances that resulted in Figures 6 through 9, the Gordon Growth Model 
predictions are very much more stable and realistic than the chaotic and the alternately overly 
optimistic to pessimistic results of using past price gains in a backward-looking prediction model. Past-
price-based valuation models appear to be more of a game of chance than a sound investment input. 
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Figure 6: Worth and equilibrium price over time with a one-year backward-looking expectation 
                                                          
11  See Gleick, 1988. Chaos: Making a New Science for a detailed discussion of how chaotic outcomes can arise 
from simple non-linear models. 
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Figure 7: Price and worth change over time with a one-year backward-looking expectation 
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Figure 8: Price and worth change over time with a one-year backward-looking expectation 
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Figure 9: Price and worth change over time with a thee-year backward-looking expectation 
CONCLUSIONS 
Buy cheap and sell dear is ancient investment advice that traces back to Aristotle (350 BCE)—who 
attributed to Thales the Milesian (6th Century BCE). The cynicism of this advice is evident in its 
implementation difficulties and in its failure to consider motives other than profit. The key findings in 
this study are: 
A) General Logic: 
 Price differs from Value—Price may be equal, greater than, or lesser than Value, 
 A sale requires that the buyer’s value estimate exceed that of the seller (i.e. buyers tend to be 
more optimistic than sellers—buyers are bulls and sellers are bears), 
 Price differs from Worth—Price may be equal, greater than, or lesser than Worth, 
 The sales price is derived from within the overlap of a seller’s and a buyer’s imperfect value-
estimates of market worth (P = Vs = Vb), and 
 Buy cheap and sell dear ultimately simplifies to the non-worth-based-investing logic of: The 
Greater Fool Theory. 
 B) Equilibrium Market Analysis: 
 Prices are set on the margin (i.e. by active sellers and buyers) and are little affected by total 
supply, 
 Even large shifts in supply have relatively little effect on the equilibrium (market) price and 
quantity sold—governments should not expect to be able to lower housing prices by adding 
reasonable numbers of units to the housing stock, 
 Changes in the interest rates should have significant effects on the equilibrium (market) price and 
quantity sold—thus, governments should be able to manage housing prices by altering the 
interest rate. NB: An interest rate housing policy tool will be blunted if other policies are buffering 
the effective interest rates experienced by the buyers and sellers (e.g. if negative gearing is 
available to housing owners or if depreciation is deductible for rental units but is not recaptured 
as regular income when the house is sold). 
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C) Dynamic Market Analysis: 
 Incorporating backward-looking gains information into a property pricing model tends to 
destabilize the market—the resulting Chaotic pricing turns a property market into more of a 
gambling arena than an investing activity. 
 A three-year backward-looking price-expectations model tends to be more Chaotic than a one-
year model and both are more prone to over- and under-estimating prices than a rational 
expectations model. 
Lags in the backward-looking price model mean that, by the time the model indicates it is time to buy, 
the turn-around has already occurred and the best time to buy may have passed. 
Future Research: 
The basic models predictions outlined in this study need to be tested against empirical data in a 
variety of markets—where possible the parameter values in the model should be estimated from 
empirical data. Also, the models’ sensitivity should be examined by testing the effects of varying key 
parameters on the model outcomes. The empirical issue of whether or not sellers, buyers, appraisers, 
and researchers avoiding the double counting of income-related capital-gain expectations is an 
important issue that should be resolved in future research.  
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